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Appellant, Salt Lake County Board of Equalization respectfully submits the 
following Brief in Reply pursuant to Rule 24 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE RIO'S LEASE WITH 
THE STATE CONSTITUTED THE USE OF PROPERTY WHICH IS A 
CONCESSION IN, OR RELATIVE TO, THE USE OF THE MUSEUM 
The Rio argues that the district court interpreted the term "concession" correctly, 
and that it does not have to show that its "use" is "in, or relative to, the use" of the 
museum. The Rio also argues that even under the Michigan construction of the statutory 
language at issue in this case, the Rio qualifies for favorable tax treatment in the form of 
an exemption. Finally, the Rio argues that the County failed to preserve for appeal its 
argument that the Rio does not use its property "in, or relative to, the use o f a public 
facility. This misrepresents the record. The County addresses these arguments below. 
A. The district court failed to interpret the concession exemption statute 
correctly because it did not strictly construe the statute or give effect and 
meaning to all the words in the statute. 
The Rio accuses the County of ignoring the term "concession" and the district 
court's interpretation of the word, Rio Brief at 17; however, it is the district court and the 
Rio, not the County, that have failed to strictly construe all the words in the statute. The 
district court's interpretation fails to strictly construe the term "concession" and fails to 
give meaning and relevance to the terms "in, or relative to," which terms were 
presumably "chosen carefully and advisedly." Gull Laboratories, Inc. v. Auditing Div., 
1 
936 P.2d 1082, 1084 (Utah Ct. App. 1997). When a taxpayer "claims the protection of an 
exemption, the burden is upon him to demonstrate clearly and unequivocally that he falls 
within the exemption; any reasonable doubt must be resolved against him." Eyring 
Research Inst., Inc. v. State Tax Comm'n, 598 P.2d 1348, 1350-51 (Utah 1979)(citation 
omitted). Exemptions are construed strictly against the taxpayer. SF Phosphates Ltd. v. 
Auditing Div., 972 P.2d 384, 386 (Utah 1998). 
To meet its burden that it qualifies for the exemption, the Rio must show: (1) that 
it uses its property as "a concession;" and (2) that such use of property as a concession is 
"in, or relative to, the use" of a relevant public facility.1 Utah Code Ann. § 59-4-
101(3)(a) (1995). The Rio did not meet this burden before the district court. 
The Rio has not met its burden of showing that its agreement is "a concession." 
The definition cited by the Michigan Courts is more restrictive than the one cited by the 
1
 The Rio claims the County did not preserve this issue for appeal. The County addresses 
this in Section 1(C) of this brief. However, the following exchange at oral argument 
shows that the County preserved the issue for appeal: 
Court: And if all the - all the State has to do to establish a concession is to give a grant, 
then what more do I need to look at? 
County: That's a very fair question, your Honor.... [The County then makes an 
argument based upon equity and fairness in the tax system] Another point, your Honor, 
the—the statute requires more than just the concession agreement. It requires a 
concession - 1 want to get the language perfectly - the use of property which is a 
concession in or relative to the use of another public facility. And I think that's 
where the specific obligations come in, the - why give a tax exemption here? Why 
would the legislature want to make an exception for concessions? If you read the 
Michigan cases, I think it's because the concession's coming in and doing something that 
the State would otherwise have to do for a public purpose. In this case, there's nothing 
in the agreement... which requires the Rio to provide a public service that's relative 
to the - the museum. R. at 659, pp. 12-13. (emphasis added) 
2 
district court. The Michigan Courts define "concession" as "a privilege or space granted 
or leased for a particular use within specific premises." City of Detroit v. Tygard, 161 
N.W.2d 1, at 3 (Mich. 1968)(emphasis added) citing World Book Encyclopedia 
Dictionary, p. 412. Another definition cited by the Michigan Courts is "ca space or 
privilege within certain premises for a subsidiary business or service.'" Golf Concepts v. 
City of Rochester Hills, 550 N.W.2d 803, 807 f.n. 3 (Mich. Ct. App. 1996) citing 
Random House Webster's College Dictionary 281, (1995). 
Since the Rio is a self-contained for-profit business, not "within" the confines of, 
or "subsidiary" to, the museum or the Amtrak leasehold, it is not a concession under the 
more restrictive definitions. "The rule that [courts] must construe tax exemption statutes 
against those seeking exemptions requires [courts] to adopt the more narrow definition 
consistent with the statute's plain language as opposed to the broad, seemingly wide-open 
definition proposed by the [Rio and the district court]." Gull Laboratories, 936 P.2d at 
1085. (insert added) Hence if the space used by the Rio were located in the museum, 
and the Rio's operations were subsidiary to the museum's operations (like the state-run 
While the County conceded before the district court that one of the definitions of a 
concession is as "a grant", the Court interrupted the County in mid-sentence and the 
County did not finish its sentence. R. at 659, p. 11. Later in the argument, however, the 
County argued to the district court at oral argument that "the notion of a concession is 
that of a subsidiary business related to a public oriented operation." R. at 659, p. 14. The 
County cited this definition from Michigan case law to support its argument. Seymour v. 
Dalton Township, 442 N.W.2d 655, 657 (Mich. Ct. App. 1989). The County also argued 
that the limited definition cited by the Rio, of a "grant" "swallowed the privilege tax 
rule." R. at 659, p. 15. The County also "disagree[d] with ... the statutory construction of 
calling a concession a grant" and urged the Court to follow the specific obligation 
requirements arising out of this more narrow definition as set forth in the Michigan cases. 
R. at 659, p. 17-18. 
^ 
museum bookstore), the Rio may qualify for the exemption. As a self-contained for-
profit restaurant, however, the Rio does not qualify. 
The Rio argues that the County's interpretation is "devoid of logic" and argues that 
the County's interpretation precludes exemption for locker and restroom facilities at 
sporting venues and would "require that the concession stands should be open any time 
the gates are open - even during open practices or after the game is over." Rio Brief at 
16-17. Notwithstanding the absurd suggestion that a governmental entity would hire a 
private entity to run as a concession the locker and restroom facilities at a sports arena, 
the County's interpretation does not require that concession stands be open during 
practices or after games. A concession stand open to serve customers at a sporting event, 
concert, or golf course, would qualify for the exemption because the services offered are 
"incidental to and subsumed by a larger public purpose," unlike the Rio's self-contained 
operation. Seymour v. Dalton Township, 442 N.W.2d 655, 658 (Mich. Ct. App. 1989). 
The district court's construction, on the other hand, would extend the exemption to 
restaurants, travel agencies, ski rental shops, grocery stores, or beauty parlors (or any 
3
 The Rio argues that the County's South Mountain Golf Course concessionaire hosts 
events after hours when the golf course is not open. Unlike the Rio, which is open every 
night separate and apart from any other public facility, the golf course concessionaire is 
"in" the golf course clubhouse, and its use is subsumed by the public purposes 
surrounding the golf course. The County attempted to use this, and other, concession 
agreements as evidence before the State Tax Commission to demonstrate the specific 
obligations inherent in a concession agreement. The Tax Commission, at the Rio's 
bequest, did not find the agreements relevant and excluded the agreements as evidence. 
Contrary to the Rio's assertion, the South Mountain agreement includes several specific 
obligations to ensure that the concessionaire uses the County's property "relative to" the 
County's golf course. Such provisions distinguish the South Mountain agreement from 
the Rio's agreement with the State. 
A 
other "grants" or leaseholds available to the public) leasing exempt property physically 
adjacent to a publicly owned sports arena or other exempt public facility, even if the lease 
agreements creating such operations contained no provisions establishing a subsidiary, or 
other, relationship between the "use" of the leased property and the "use" of the sports 
arena, as required by the plain language of the statute. 
The Rio has also failed to meet its burden that it uses its property "in, or relative 
to, the use" of the museum. The undisputed facts show that the Rio's use is not "in" the 
museum or Amtrak leasehold, nor is its "use" ... "relative to ... the use" of the museum. 
The Rio attempts to deflect its burden onto the County by arguing that the Rio's burden 
"must not be permitted to frustrate the exemption's objective." Corp. of Episcopal 
Church v. State Tax Comm'n, 919 P.2d 566, 568 (Utah 1996). Despite its charge, the 
Rio fails to state what objective is being frustrated, or how the County's interpretation 
would frustrate this unidentified objective. 
The Court of Appeals of Michigan stated that one of the requirements of the 
Michigan exemption, which Utah adopted "with alacrity," Gordon L. Roberts, The Utah 
Tax on the Use of Tax Exempt Property, 9 Utah L. Rev. 415, 416 (1964), was that "the 
venture should be a subsidiary business incidentally related to a public oriented 
operation, rather than a privatized, self-contained operation." American Golf of Detroit 
v. City of Huntington Woods, 570 N.W.2d 469, 471 (Mich. Ct. App. 1997). The district 
court's construction allows an exemption to private, self-contained operations like the 
Rio simply because it is adjacent to a public facility, but denies the exemption to 
similarly situated private restaurants leasing or owning private property, without any 
5 
policy justification. The exemption should only be allowed where the applying entity 
proves beyond a "reasonable doubt" that it uses its property as a subsidiary business in, or 
relative to, the use of a public oriented operation. Eyring Research Inst., Inc., 598 P.2d at 
1350-51. See also The Utah Tax on the Use of Tax Exempt Property, 9 Utah L. Rev. 
415, 418 (stating that "there does not appear to be any obvious reason why [concessions] 
should not be taxed as other businesses are" (insert added)). 
Treating similarly situated taxpayers differently violates the principles most 
central to Utah's tax system, those of equality and uniformity, "the just and ultimate 
purpose of the [tax] law." Rio Algom Co. v. San Juan County, 681 P.2d 184 (Utah 
1984)(insertadded). In Interwest Aviation v. County Board of Equalization of Salt Lake 
County4, the Utah Supreme Court stated that ".. .the established policy that allows [for 
the privilege tax] is directly supported by the principle that there should be an equal 
distribution of the tax burden among the entire tax base, absent overriding reasons to the 
contrary." 743 P.2d 1222, 1225 (Utah 1987) (insert added)(citations omitted). The Rio 
fails to identify "any overriding reasons" or policies supporting the district court's liberal 
construction of the exemption statute, especially where a more strict construction of the 
plain language of the statute is available. 
4
 In Interwest, a for-profit taxpayer sought the concession exemption on property it 
owned, thereby making the business subject to ad valorem property taxes, and not 
eligible for the exemption from privilege tax. The Interwest court did not define 
"concession" and did not analyze whether the taxpayer used its property "in, or relative 
to, the use" of another public facility, and is not of any analytical value to the 
construction of the exemption statute subject to this case. 743 P.2d 1222 (Utah 1987). 
fs 
The Rio's reliance on State Dept. of Assessments and Taxation v. Maryland-
National Capital Park and Planning Comm'n does not help its case. 702 A.2d 690 (Md. 
1997). Unlike the Utah and Michigan statutes cited by the County, the Maryland statute 
merely requires that the concession be located "in a public airport, park, or fairground." 
The parties in National Capital Park stipulated that the concession was "in" the Park. 702 
A.2d at 696. The parties in this action have not so stipulated, and in fact, it is undisputed 
that the space leased by the Rio is not within the confines of the space used by the 
museum or the Amtrak leasehold. R. at 3, ^  13; R. at 188, Tf 13. The Maryland statute 
does not require that the use of the concession be "in, or relative to, the use" of the public 
facility, as the Utah and Michigan statutes require. The Maryland court also fails to cite 
the more restrictive definition of the term "concession" and relied upon the less strict 
definition supported by the district court. National Capital Park, 702 A.2d at 696-697. 
The district court essentially rewrites the exemption statute, to read much like the 
less restrictive Maryland statute, and allows an exemption for "the use of property, which 
is a leasehold (not a concession) in public property (the Depot, not the museum or train 
station), 'which contains5 a public airport, park, fairground or similar property (museum 
and Amtrak leasehold), which is available as a matter of right to the use of the general 
public." R. at 578, ^ f 4. The district court removes the requirement that the Rio's "use of 
the property" be "a concession in, or relative to, the use" of the museum and Amtrak 
leasehold. That is not what the statute says, and the district court's decision should 
therefore be reversed in favor of the County. 
7 
B. The Rio's lease with the State does not qualify for the exemption under the 
Michigan definition of "concession" because it lacks the imposition of 
obligations directed toward the fulfillment of a public purpose. 
The Rio does not qualify for the concessionaire exemption as construed by the 
Michigan courts. The Michigan Courts have defined 'concession' as "ca space or 
privilege within certain premises for a subsidiary business or service.'" Golf Concepts, 
550 N.W.2d at 807 f n. 3 (Mich. Ct. App. 1996) citing Random House Webster's College 
Dictionary, 281 (1995); R. 659, p. 14, lines 22-23. A concession invokes "the concept of 
specific obligations on the part of the privileged party to maintain particular services at 
specified times." Tygard, 161 N.W.2dat3. 
Such obligations include (1) "the concept of exclusivity5," (2) "minimum hours 
during which the services offered must be made available to the public," and (3) 
"standards of service ... [which] must bear a reasonable relationship to the purposes o f 
the public museum. Id. at 4. The Michigan Courts also look to (4) "oversight of fees 
charged to the public" and (5) "oversight of operations." Seymour, 442 N.W.2d at 657. 
These requirements must be "stated with specificity" and be "'directed toward the 
fulfillment of a public purpose.'" Golf Concepts, 550 N.W.2d at 807 (Mich. Ct. App. 
1996)(internal citation omitted). 
The Rio's lease with the State is not that of "a subsidiary business or service" and 
does not state any specific obligations directed toward the fulfillment of a public service. 
5The Rio correctly points out that later Michigan cases have done away with the 
exclusivity requirement, but then misleadingly implies that it has exclusive right to serve 
food at the Depot, when in fact the lease merely provides that it has exclusive use of the 
space it is leasing. Rio Brief at 25, R. at 27-28. The lease expressly provides that the 
State may contract for food services in other areas of the Depot. R. at 28. 
8 
(1) The Rio does not have exclusive use to offer food services at the Depot. R. at 28 
("The State reserves the right to sell, dispense or contract for the sale of food and non-
food items in other areas of the [Depot]"). (2) The lease does not require minimum hours 
during which the services must be offered to the general public. R. at 27-42. (3) The 
lease lacks any specific standards of service, but merely provides that the Rio must hire 
enough employees to provide "prompt, efficient service." R. at 32. (4) The lease does not 
provide for any oversight of fees charged to the public. R. at 27-42. Finally, (5) the State 
does not retain any oversight of operations over the manner in which the Rio operates its 
business. 
The Rio relies on extrinsic evidence, a recital to the contract, to support its 
exemption claim. The recital provides that "the State is desirous of having a 
restaurant/cafeteria operated at said location for the convenience of employees, visitors, 
and general public of the State." R. at 27. The Rio claims that this recital invokes a 
specific obligation upon the Rio. However, "recitals are only preliminary in nature and 
will not, of themselves, be considered binding obligations on the parties or an effective 
part of their agreement unless referred to in the operative portion of their agreement." 
First Bank and Trust Co. v. Village of Orland Hills, 787 N.E.2d 300, 308 (111. Ct. App. 
2003)(holding that trial court did not erroneously consider extrinsic evidence when it 
looked in part to recital to interpret contract, where the trial court looked principally to 
operative portion of agreement). Furthermore, the Rio argues that because the contract 
does not provide a provision affirmatively requiring the Rio to pay the privilege tax, that 
this distinguishes it from the Tygard case cited by the County. Rio Brief at 24-25. Since 
9 
it is in both the Rio's and the State's best interest that the Rio not pay the privilege tax, it 
is not surprising that the parties left this out of the contract. The Rio fails to explain how 
this absent provision amounts to a specific obligation relative to a public facility. Also, 
the agreement between the State and the Rio does provide several provisions similar to 
the contracts in the Michigan cases cited by the County and most leases. R. at 27-38. 
These provisions do not refer to the museum or the Amtrak leasehold, except to clarify 
that the State can contract or sell food items in the museum or Amtrak station, and to 
divide up janitorial costs for the bathroom shared by the Rio and the museum. R. at 28, 
36. These provisions are not "specific obligations" making the Rio's use subsidiary, or 
"relative to," the use of the other facilities in the Depot. 
The Rio's obligations are even less stringent than the obligations construed by the 
Seymour court, which denied the exemption in that case. In that case, "minimum hours, 
standards of service, or oversight of operations by the city are conspicuously absent. 
Oversight of fees is not strenuous.... The maintenance requirement is consistent with the 
[State's] interest in protecting its reversion after the termination of the agreement and 
do[] not appear to be directed toward exacting some specific term or service for the 
public benefit." Seymour, 442 N.W.2d at 657. The Rio's contract does not provide any 
oversight of fees. At all relevant times, the Rio, like the taxpayer in Seymour, "had an 
unacceptable degree of discretion to run [its restaurant] as [it] saw fit, without the 
imposition of obligations directed toward the fulfillment of a public purpose." Id For 
these reasons, the County requests that this Court reverse the district court's order and 
grant summary judgment in favor of the County. 
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C. The Record shows that the County preserved its "in, or relative to" 
argument for appeal. 
The Rio claims that the parties failed to preserve for appeal the argument that the 
Rio does not use its property as "a concession in, or relative to, the use o f the museum. 
Utah Code Ann. § 59-4-101(3)(a)(1995). This is a misrepresentation of the record. 
"To preserve an issue for appeal, a party must first raise the issue before the trial 
court." Hart v. Salt Lake County Comm'n, 945 P.2d 125, 129 (Utah Ct. App. 1997). An 
issue "is sufficiently raised if it is submitted to the trial court, and the court is afforded an 
opportunity to rule on that issue." Id. (citation omitted). There are three requirements 
that a party must satisfy to show that a party has afforded an opportunity to the district 
court to rule on an issue. 
First, the issue must be raised in a timely fashion.... Second, the 
issue must be specifically raised ... such that the issue is sufficiently 
raised to a 'level of consciousness5 before the trial court. Third, the 
party must introduce to the trial court 'supporting evidence or 
relevant legal authority' to support its argument. 
Id. at 130. (internal citations omitted) The record shows that the parties preserved this 
issue for appeal. 
The County raised the issue of whether the Rio used its property as "a concession 
in, or relative to, the use" of a relevant public facility: (1) before the Tax Commission, R. 
at 21-22, App. A; (2) in its Petition for Review before the district court, R. at 4, f^ 18, 
App. B; (3) in its Reply (as the Rio itself admits), R. at 449-450, and in its Response to 
the Rio's Motion for Summary Judgment, including affidavits supporting its argument, R. 
at 325-33, 359-362, 545-46, 578, App. C; and at length in its oral argument, R. at 659, p. 
11 
6, lines 12-15; p. 10, lines 11-19; p. 12 line 16 -p . 13, line 4; p. 15, lines 18-25. Ex.D. 
Likewise, the Rio raised the issue in its Motion for Summary Judgment, R. at 259-260, 
Ex. E. The district court also ruled on the issue, though incorrectly, when it concluded 
that the Rio qualified for the exemption because it is "in" the Depot, R. at 578, ^ f 4; R. at 
659, p. 27, lines 15-18, App. F. The Rio's contention that neither party raised this issue 
is curious when one considers that the Rio has the burden "to demonstrate clearly and 
unequivocally that [it] falls within the exemption." Eyring Research Inst., Inc, 598 P.2d 
at 1350-51 (Utah 1979)(citation omitted)(insert added). It cannot "fall[] within the 
exemption" unless it proves it falls within the requirements of the statute. 
The County (and the Rio) raised the issue before the district court, thereby timely 
raising the issue; the County raised the issue in its pleadings and presented evidence and 
legal authority, in its papers and at oral argument, showing that the Rio did not use its 
property relative to the use of the museum, thereby raising the issue to the district court's 
"level of consciousness"; and the County supported its claim with the same legal 
authority (mainly the plain language of the statute and supporting case law) it relied upon 
in its brief, and disagreed with the district court's suggestion that the district court should 
only interpret the word "concession" in the exemption statute. R. at 659, p. 12, lines 16-
23. The district court took this information and incorrectly ruled that the Rio qualifies for 
the exemption because it is located "in" the Depot. R. at 578. 
Even //'the parties did not raise the issue, which they did, "'[a]n appellate court 
has inherent authority to consider issues which the parties have not raised if doing so is 
necessary to a proper decision.' (citation omitted) .... [A]n overlooked or abandoned 
12 
argument should not compel an erroneous result. [This Court] should not be forced to 
ignore the law just because the parties have not raised or pursued obvious arguments." 
Kaiserman Assoc. Inc. v. Francis Town, 977 P.2d 462, 464 (Utah 1999)(addressing issue 
that garnishment is not a pleading raised before trial court but not adequately briefed 
before supreme court). The Rio would have this Court ignore the obvious requirement of 
the statute that it must use its property "in, or relative to, the use" of the museum or 
Amtrak station to merit the advantages of the exemption. 
Also, even if the parties did fail to raise this issue, which they did not, it would 
have been plain error for the court to find that the Rio qualified for the exemption where 
the district court failed to find that the Rio met all the requirements of the statute. The 
plain error exception requires the County to show that: (1) an error exists, (2) the error 
should have been obvious to the district court, and (3) the error is harmful. Hart, 945 
P.2datl31,fn. 3. 
In this case, had the district court not erroneously found that the Rio's existence 
"in" or "at" the Depot was sufficient to qualify for the exemption, it would have been an 
error for the district court to grant the exemption where the Rio had the burden to prove 
its "use" was "in, or relative to, the use" of the museum or Amtrak leasehold. Such error 
should have been obvious to the district court because section 101(3)(a) clearly requires 
that the exemption may only be granted for "the use of property which is a concession in, 
or relative to, the use" of a relevant public facility. Such error would have been harmful 
to the County and the other taxpayers who must pay the Rio's tax burden because it 
would allow the Rio to receive tax treatment without presenting evidence that it clearly 
meets all the requirements of the exemption. 
The Rio also complains that the County did not identify lease provisions or other 
facts6 in the record to support its argument before the district court. Rio Brief at 13-14. 
The Rio does not present any legal authority to support the relevance of this complaint. 
The Rio's complaint is not unlike a claim made by an insurance company in Progressive 
Casualty Ins. Co. v. Dalgleish, 2002 UT 59, ^ 14, 52 P.3d 1142, 1146. In Dalgleish, an 
insured injured in an automobile accident failed to specifically identify to the district 
court a determinative lease provision relevant to the insured's claim against the insurance 
company. The Utah Supreme Court noted in a footnote that: 
We note that there is no indication in the record that the parties 
brought this particular provision to the district court's attention. 
However, the issue regarding incorporation was raised below, and 
the insurance policy was submitted to the district court. It is 
therefore appropriate on appeal to examine the entire insurance 
policy in determining whether the "minimum statutory limits" were 
properly incorporated. 
I d a t f 14, fn. 5. 
Likewise, while the County did not specifically identify the lease provisions to the 
district court, "the issue regarding [the Rio's use] was raised below, and the [Rio's lease 
6
 The County points out the gap between the Rio's hours of operation and the museum's 
hours of operations to illustrate the separate nature of the Rio's use under its lease 
relative to the museum's operation. County Brief at 29. The County does not argue that 
the gap in hours is determinative, as implied by the Rio, but illustrative. Rio Brief at 20. 
The Tax Commission case of Salt Lake County Assessor v. Salt Lake County Board of 
Equalization, Appeals 94-1294 through 94-1305, February 3, 1997, cited by the Rio has 
no precedential effect in this proceeding. 
agreement with the State and the hours of operation were] submitted to the district court. 
It is therefore appropriate on appeal to examine the [entire lease agreement and the hours 
of operation] in determining whether the [Rio used its property as a concession in, or 
relative to, the use of a relevant public facility]." Id. (inserts added). The lease 
provisions and the lack of significant overlap in hours support the County's position that 
the Rio's use is independent from, and not "in, or relevant to, the use" of the museum. 
Thus, the County requests that this Court consider the evidence and arguments it 
presented in its initial brief. 
POINT II 
THE RIO'S POSSESSION OF THE SUBJECT PROPERTY 
IS "ESCAPED PROPERTY." 
The Rio argues that since the privilege tax is "imposed on the possession or other 
beneficial use" of exempt property, its possessory interest does not qualify as "escaped 
property." In 1995, and currently, the term "property" "means property which is subject 
to assessment and taxation according to its value...," Utah Code Ann. § 59-2-103(19) 
(1995) and "includes ... the possession of, claim to, ownership of, or right to the 
possession of property. Utah Code § 59-2-103(2 l)(a) (1995)(emphasis added).7 If this 
7
 As it did in arguing that the County did not preserve its argument for appeal, the Rio 
self-servingly misrepresents the County's position. Rio Brief, p. 27, fn. 6. The Rio 
claims that the County cited Utah Code Ann. § 59-2-102 (19)(1995) to define property, 
and that such definition did not include "intangibles" in 1995. The County did not cite to 
the statute the Rio criticizes the County for allegedly using. The County cited the 2003 
version of Utah Code Ann. § 59-2-102 (21), which states that "Real estate or property' 
includes possessory interests. The provision relied upon by the County has not been 
amended since 1995. App. G. It is clear from subsection (21) that, in 1995 and currently, 
Court finds that the Rio is subject to privilege tax, such tax will be on "the same amount 
that the ad valorem property tax would be if the possessor or user were the owner of the 
property," Utah Code Ann. §59-4-101(2)(1995), and would thus be "subject to 
assessment and taxation according to its value." 
"'Escaped property' means any property, [including possessory interests] whether 
personal, land, or any improvements to the property, subject to taxation and is (i) 
inadvertently omitted from the tax rolls, assigned to the incorrect parcel, or assessed to 
the wrong taxpayer by the assessing authority." Utah Code Ann. § 59-2-102(7)(a)(i) 
(1995)(insert added). The privilege tax is "on the [Rio's] possession or other beneficial 
use" of the Depot. Utah Code Ann. § 59-4-101 (l)(a) (1995). 
The Rio argues that since "there is no question that the State does not pay property 
taxes on its own property," Rio Brief at 29, that the State cannot be the "wrong taxpayer" 
for purposes of an escaped property assessment. The term "wrong" means "not 
according to truth or facts: INCORRECT." Merriam-Webster's Collegiate Dictionary 
1363 (10th ed. 2001)(emphasis in original). The County did not assess the property to 
the right, or correct, taxpayer, when it assessed the Rio's possessory interest to the State 
of Utah. Thus, it assessed the unreported parcel to the "wrong" or "incorrect" taxpayer 
when it assessed it to an entity other than the Rio. Moreover, the State is required to 
"collect and pay a proportional tax" when it purchases property from other taxpayers, 
Utah Code Ann. § 59-2-1101(1) (1995), (emphasis added) thereby making the State a 
property includes possessory interests, such as the Rio's possessory interest in the Depot 
property. 
"taxpayer," or "one that pays or is liable for a tax." Merriam-Webster's Collegiate 
Dictionary 1204 (10th ed. 2001). Under the Rio's construction of the statute, an escaped 
property assessment would not be assessed if the County Assessor incorrectly assessed 
property to an exempt entity, while others whose property is incorrectly assessed to 
neighbors or others would be subject to such an assessment. This disparate treatment is 
neither fair, nor supported by the plain language of the statute. 
The district court agreed with the County's interpretation, but did not impose the 
escaped property provisions because it erroneously found that the Rio was not "subject to 
taxation" for its possessory interest in the Depot. R. at 659, p. 19, lines 2-3. If this Court 
finds that the Rio is "subject to taxation," it requests that this Court uphold the County's 
"escaped property" assessment for the 1990-1994 tax years. 
POINT III 
THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED WHEN IT FOUND THAT THE RIO 
WAS OPEN ON SATURDAYS FROM 11:30 A.M. - 2:30 P.M. 
The only evidence before the district court relating to hours of operation was the 
stipulation between the parties, which the Rio relied upon in its Motion for Summary 
Judgment. The Stipulation provides that: 
The Rio's hours of operation are 11:00 a.m. to 2:30 p.m. and from 5:00 p.m. to 
9:30 p.m. five days a week and from 5:00 p.m. to 11:00 p.m. on the weekend. 
R. at 273, % 9. The Rio did not present any evidence to the contrary, but referred 
to evidence not in the record before this Court. The Stipulation of the parties "'acts as an 
estoppel upon the parties thereto and is conclusive of all matters necessarily included in 
the stipulation."' Yeargin, Inc. v. Auditing Div., 2001 UT 11, % 20, 20 P.3d 287 (citation 
omitted). This discrepancy, though minor, illustrates that the Rio did not operate as a 
subsidiary business relative to the other facilities in the Depot, but as a separate, self-
contained operation. Thus, this Court should find that the district court erred and state 
the facts according to the parties' stipulation. 
RESPONSE TO CROSS APPEAL 
Appellant/Cross-Appellee, Salt Lake County Board of Equalization, respectfully 
submits the following in response to Appellee's Cross-Appeal pursuant to Rule 24 of the 
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
ARGUMENT 
THE RIO IS NOT ENTITLED TO AN AWARD OF LITIGATION EXPENSES 
BECAUSE IMPOSITION OF THE PRIVILEGE TAX IS NOT 'A REGULATORY 
FUNCTION/ AND BECAUSE THE COUNTY'S POSITION IS NOT WITHOUT 
'SUBSTANTIAL JUSTIFICATION/ 
The district court correctly ruled that the Rio is not entitled to an award of 
litigation expenses. The Rio fails to identify which of two statutes applies to its specious 
claim that it merits an award of litigation expenses; however, the pertinent language in 
each statute provides: 
In any civil judicial action [or civil judicial appeal] commenced by 
the state, which action involves the business regulatory functions of 
the state, a court may award reasonable litigation expenses to any 
small business which is a named party in the action if the small 
business prevails and the court finds that the state action was 
undertaken without substantial justification. 
Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-27a-4, 5 (2003). 
The Rio does not qualify for litigation expenses because (A) the action does not involve 
"the business regulatory functions of the state," and (B) the court did not find "that the 
state action was undertaken without substantial justification." 
A. The Rio's privilege tax exemption claim does not involve the business 
regulatory functions of the state. 
Because the assessment of a privilege tax does not involve the "business 
regulatory functions of the state," the Rio does not qualify for litigation expenses under 
§§ 78-27a-4, 5. "Generally speaking, a tax raises revenue for general governmental 
purposes, while a fee raises revenue either to compensate the government for the 
provision of a specific service or benefit to the one paying the fee or to defray the 
government's cost of regulating and policing a business or activity engaged in by one 
paying the fee." V-l Oil Co. v. Utah State Tax Commission, 942 P.2d 906, 911 (Utah 
1997)(reversed on motion for rehearing on other grounds). 
The privilege tax raises revenue for general governmental purposes and is not a 
fee. It is not designed "to defray the government's cost of regulating or policing a 
business or activity." Id The Rio has failed to identify what action, if any, the Board is 
allegedly regulating, and has failed to describe which "regulatory function" the Board has 
allegedly exercised that is relevant to this appeal. The power to tax and the power to 
regulate are separate powers derived from separate statutory provisions. Consolidation 
Coal Co., et al. v. Emery County, et al., 702 P.2d 121, 123 (Utah 1985)(citing 9 E. 
McQuillan, The Law of Municipal Corporations § 26.15, at 29 (3d ed. Rev. 1978)). 
Consolidation Coal involved an ordinance enacted by Emery County to collect a 
license fee. The court found that the fee collected was not of a regulatory nature because 
"the revenue to be raised from the additional fee provision ... bore no relationship to the 
cost of enforcing the ordinance and that the provision was intended as a general revenue 
measure with little, if any, regulatory purpose or effect." Id. at 127. The court therefore 
struck down the ordinance because the County did not have the statutory authority to 
raise revenue, "except insofar as such revenue is necessary to (and therefore 
proportionate to the cost of) regulation of the licensed entities." IdL Like the fee in 
Consolidation Coal the privilege tax bears no relationship to the cost of enforcing a 
statute or ordinance and its purpose is as a general revenue measure with no regulatory 
purpose or effect. The difference is that counties have statutory authority to levy a 
privilege tax under Utah Code Ann. § 59-4-101 et seq. whereas Emery County did not 
have authority to collect the general revenue raising license fee in Consolidation. 
The Rio relies on V-l Oil for the proposition that the assessment and collection of 
a tax qualifies as a "business regulatory function of the state" even though the VI-Oil 
Court did not address the issue. The United States Supreme Court has held that a prior 
decision is not binding precedent on a point not raised in briefs or arguments, or not 
discussed in the Court's opinion. United States et al. v. L.A. Tucker Truck Lines, Inc., 
344 U.S. 33, 37-38 (1952)(stating that the Supreme Court "is not bound by a prior 
exercise of jurisdiction in a case where it was not questioned and it was passed sub 
silentio"). The VI-Oil court did not address, and the parties did not brief or raise 
arguments, relative to whether an act arising out of the taxing powers of the State are 
"business regulatory functions" for purposes of §§ 78-27a-4 or 5. 
The V-l Oil court did not address whether a tax qualifies as a regulatory function 
of the state. The Rio's assumption arises from silence and ignores the findings of the 
Utah Supreme Court in other cases where the court distinguished the government's taxing 
powers from the government's regulatory powers. See Consolidation Coal Co., 702 P.2d 
at 124(stating that a county may impose a license primarily as a means of regulating 
businesses, as an exercise of its police power, or it may license to raise revenue, as an 
exercise of its taxing power); Weber Basin Home Builders Association v. Roy City, 487 
P.2d 866, 867 (Utah 1971)(stating that money collected to service, regulate, or police 
activity is a fee; whereas, money collected for general revenue purposes is a tax); Davis 
v. Ogden City, 215 P.2d 616, 622 (Utah 1950)(stating that a license fee is based upon 
police power to regulate or prohibit a business and tax is intended to raise revenue). 
Thus, because the assessment and enforcement of the privilege tax is not a 
"regulatory function of the state," but is designed to collect revenue for general 
governmental purposes, the Board respectfully requests that this Court deny the Rio's 
motion for an award of litigation expenses. 
B. The Board did not appeal the Tax Commission's decision "without 
substantial justification/9 
To support its claim that the County did not have substantial justification to make 
its arguments before the district court, the Rio makes the erroneous argument that the 
County "quite obviously" does "not have statutory authority to pursue" its good faith 
interpretation of exemption statutes. The Rio makes this claim because the County is 
"subject to regulation and control by the commission as prescribed by law." Utah Code 
Ann. § 59-2-1004 (2003). 
The Rio ignores the County's statutory authority to appeal Tax Commission 
decisions. Utah Code Ann. § 59-l-602(l)(a) provides that "[a]ny aggrieved party 
appearing before the commission or county whose tax revenues are affected by the 
decision may at that party's option petition for judicial review in the district court...." 
The County is an "aggrieved party" and its tax revenues are affected by the Tax 
Commission's liberal interpretation of the concessionaire exemption statute. The Rio's 
suggestion that the County "quite obviously" does not have the statutory authority to 
appeal Tax Commission decisions is absurd and contrary to the established relationship 
between the Tax Commission and the various counties. Even if the County's 
interpretation were, as the Rio alleges without support , "self-serving, convenient, and 
flawed," Rio Brief at 34, the County still has every right and authority to appeal Tax 
Commission decisions that run contrary to its established policy. 
The Rio relies on dicta from Vl-Oil to support its claim that the Board has acted 
"without substantial justification." The Vl-Oil Court stated, "if a state agency arbitrarily 
8
 The Rio insinuates without support that the County gives special treatment to its own 
facilities, and then "they want to fight everybody else." R. at 659, p. 23, lines 4-9. The 
Rio does not present any facts or evidence that the County treats concessionaires at 
County facilities any differently than it treats potential concessions at facilities owned by 
other entities. Had the Rio done its research, it would have discovered that the County 
has not granted the concession exemption to several privilege taxpayers using County 
facilities. The Rio's use of unsupported accusations and insinuations has no place in an 
appellate brief and should be disregarded by this Court. 
interpreted a statute to the detriment of a small business, this abuse of the agency's power 
by exceeding its scope of discretion in interpreting a statute would support a finding that 
the state had acted 'without substantial justification."' 942 P.2d at 915. The Board relied 
upon the interpretation of the Michigan statute on which the Utah privilege tax and 
concession exemption is based. In Utah and Michigan, exemption statutes are to be 
construed strictly in favor of taxation. Because the Utah statute is based upon the 
Michigan statute, the Michigan cases relied upon by the Board are the best legal authority 
available to the Board and the Assessor's Office to interpret the term "concession" in the 
context of a privilege tax exemption. While the Rio and the district court apparently 
disagree with the Board, the Rio has not shown how the Board's interpretation is 
"arbitrary" when the Salt Lake County Assessor and the Board consistently applied the 
standards set forth in the Michigan cases in determining who does and who does not 
qualify for the exemption. This Court and the Rio may have found the standard applied 
by the Board too strict, but the Rio has not shown how it is "arbitrary." 
As the district court found, the County is not "without substantial justification" in 
arguing that "the notion of a concession is that of a subsidiary business related to a public 
oriented operation," from Michigan case law. R. at 659, p. 14. The County also is 
justified in arguing that "[tjhere's nothing in the [Rio's lease] that ties the use of the Rio 
to the use of the museum or the use of the Amtrak station," R. at 659, p. 15 where the 
statute requires the Rio to show that it uses its property "in, or relative to, the use" of 
those facilities, and where the Rio has not identified one lease provision that establishes 
such a relationship. Not only is the County substantially justified in making these 
arguments, the County has the responsibility and obligation to pursue those arguments 
furthering the fair, uniform, and equal assessment of all properties in the County, which 
is exactly what it is doing in this case. 
The County also argued with "substantial justification" in raising its constitutional 
issue before the district court that: (1) the Tax Commission did not have any authority to 
address constitutional issues, Nebeker v. Utah State Tax Com'n, 2001 UT 74, ^  24, 34 
P.3d 180; and (2) the trial court had jurisdiction to hear the County's claim. The Utah 
Supreme Court stated, in interpreting the language of Utah Code Ann. § 59-1-601, that 
section 601, "does not operate only to limit the Commission's discretion in conducting its 
article XIII, section 11 duties, it effectively eliminates the Commission's role whenever 
one of the parties chooses to seek review under that section. The Commission's prior 
decision becomes a nullity, and the district court conducts an original, independent 
proceeding." Evans & Sutherland Computer Co. v. Tax Comm'n, 953 P.2d 435,443 
(Utah 1998)(striking as unconstitutional section 601 before constitutional amendment 
gave district court jurisdiction to hear "all matters decided" by the Commission). 
The County had substantial justification to bring an "original, independent" claim 
in the "original, independent proceeding" before the district court. Since the County's 
Petition for Review essentially eliminated the Tax Commission's role in the proceedings, 
and since the action before the district court was an "original" and "independent" 
proceeding, the County's "original" and "independent" constitutional claim was not 
"without substantial justification"9 before the district court. For these reasons, the 
County requests that this Court uphold the district court's denial of litigation expenses. 
CONCLUSION 
The County respectfully asks this Court to reverse the district court's grant of 
summary judgment in favor of the Rio, and grant summary judgment in favor of the 
County. The district court erred in finding that the Rio uses its property as a concession 
in, or relative to, the use of the other public facilities at the Depot. The County invites 
this Court to apply the well-reasoned standard developed by the Michigan courts in 
construing the concession exemption statute. Moreover, because the district court erred 
in granting the Rio's request for an exemption, this Court should also find the Rio's 
possession of the property it uses is "escaped property" for the 1990 - 1994 tax years. 
The County also requests that this Court adopt the findings of facts entered into by the 
parties in their stipulation. Finally, the County asks this Court to uphold the district 
court's order denying the Rio's request for litigation expenses because the Rio's privilege 
tax claim neither involved the regulatory functions of the State, nor did the County appeal 
the Tax Commission's decision without substantial justification. 
DATED this £r_ day of June, 2004. 
DAVID E. YOCOM 
Salt Lake County District Attorney 
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ADDENDUM A 
Rio, Inc dba Rio Grade Cafe v. Board of Equalization, USTC 98-1179 
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Final Decision, 
pp. 14-15; R. at 21-22 
Appeal No. 98-1179 
''The use of property which is a concession in, or relative to. the use 
of a public airport, park, fairground, or similar property which is 
available as a matter of right to the use of the general public." 
(emphasis added) 
It is certain that the property at issue in this proceeding is not a public airport, park 
or fairground. Therefore, the issue is whether the depot, including the Rio, museum, and Amtrak 
Station is a "similar property which is available as a matter of right to the use of the general public." 
In this case, the D&RG Depot is a facility being used primarily by the general public, 
both as a train station, a museum operated by the State Historical Society, and a public restaurant. 
A train station is similar to a public airport. A museum, in this context, is similar to a park. As such, 
the Commission determines that the use of the subject property is a "concession in, or relative to, 
the use of a public airport, park, fairground, or similar property which is available as a matter of right 
to the use of the general public." 
Respondent also argues that the Cafe is not "in or relative to" the D&RG Depot or 
the museum because the agreement does not require the hours of operation to coincide with the hours 
of operation of either the depot or the museum. In fact, due to changes in Amtrack's schedule, no 
trains arrive during the hours of operation of the Cafe, as do some passengers awaiting trains. It 
appears that visitors to the museum also patronize the Cafe and it is reasonable to assume that the 
Cafe itself attracts lunch patrons who then decide to visit the museum. Moreover, the Cafe is clearly 
located within the D&RG Depot building. It appears as a separate parcel only because Respondent 
chose to give it a special parcel number for tax purposes. Accordingly, we find that the Cafe is both 
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"in" a railroad depot and "relative to" the depot and the museum. As noted above, whether or not 
the operating hours of the Cafe, the museum and the depot are co-extensive is a matter of contract 
between the State and Rio. The fact that the hours are not co-extensive does not prevent this 
agreement from constituting a concession "in or relative to" the depot or the museum. 
One issue which was initially raised was whether the airport exemption contained in 
Section 17A-2-1523, Utah Code Ann. would apply to this situation. In view of the decision of the 
Commission determining that the subject property is a concession in, or relative to, a property 
similar to the list of properties, the property is exempt from the privilege tax, and it is not necessary 
to decide whether the airport exemption applies. 
DECISION AND ORDFR 
Based upon the foregoing, the Commission determines that the subject property is 
exempt from the application of the privilege tax because it constitutes a concession in, or relative 
to, the use of a public airport, park, fairground, or similar property which is available as a matter of 
right to the use of the general public. The property was not subject to tax, and was therefore not 
escaped property under Utah Code Ann. §59-2-102(11) and is not subject to the tax for five (5) years 
back under Utah Code Ann. §59-2-217. It is so ordered. 
DATED this ?4 day of ^ jyV -;*>, , 2001. 
G. Blaine Davis 
Administrative Law Judge 
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ADDENDUM B 
Board of Equalization Petition for Review, 
p .4f 18; R. at 4 
15. After the Rio appealed the assessment made by the Assessor's Office, the 
Board of Equalization of Salt Lake County upheld the imposition of the privilege tax and 
escaped assessment. The Rio appealed to the Commission. 
16. The Commission determined that the Rio is exempt from the application of 
the privilege tax under Utah Code Ann. § 59-4-101(3)(a). The Commission also found 
that because the Rio was not subject to a tax, the property it leases from the State of Utah 
does not qualify as escaped property under Utah Code Ann. § 59-2-102(11) and is not 
subject to an escaped property assessment for the five years previous to the imposition of 
the privilege tax under Utah Code Ann. § 59-2-217(1) for the years 1990 through 1994. 
First Claim for Relief 
17. Petitioner incorporates herein by reference paragraphs 1-16. 
18. The Rio does not use the property leased to it by the State as a "concession 
in, or relative to, the use of a public airport, park, fairground, or similar property which is 
available as a matter of right to the use of the general public" within the meaning of Utah 
Code Annotated § 59-4-101 (3)(a) (2000). 
Second Claim for Relief 
19. Petitioner incorporates herein by reference paragraphs 1-18. 
20. The Rio's use of the property leased to it by the State qualifies as escaped 
property within the meaning of Utah Code Annotated § 59-2-101(11) (2000). 
21. The Rio's use of the property leased to it by the State should be assessed as 
escaped property for the five years prior to 1995. Utah Code Annotated § 59-2-217 
(2000). 
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ADDENDUM C 
Board of Equalization's Reply to the Rio, Inc's Motion for Summary Judgment, 
pp. 7-8; R. at 449-50 
Board of Equalization's Opposition to the Rio's Cross Motion for Summary 
Judgment, 
pp. 1-12; R. at 323-35 
Affidavit of Max Evans 
pp. 1-4; R. at 359-62 
Board of Equalization's Opposition to The Rio's Motion to Strike, 
pp. 4-5; R. at 545-46 
The Rio argues that it is open when people generally eat. Again, this is in the 
Rio's best interest as a for profit business. If the Rio were open when hungry people get 
off the train after midnight, even though people do not generally eat at that time, then it 
might qualify as a concession because such a service would be akin to the services that 
municipalities often have to provide. This would distinguish the Rio from its competitors 
and justify different tax treatment because this would impose an obligation on the Rio, 
with which other similarly situated lessees would not have to deal. Because the Rio's 
obligations are no different than the obligations that all lessees have to deal with, the Rio 
should bear its fair burden of the tax roll. 
The Rio also argues that if it is not a "concession," it should receive the exemption 
because it is "relative to" a concession. The Rio misreads the statute. The statute is 
limited to a concession which is "in," or a concession which is "relative to," "the use of a 
public airport.. . or similar property. . .." Under the doctrines of noscitur a sociis, 
ejusdem generis, as well as the last antecedent rule, no other interpretation of subsection 
(3)(a) can be reasonably ascertained. In re Disconnection of Certain Territory from 
Highland City, 668 P.2d 544, 547-48 (Utah 1983)(fmding that where general language is 
used together with specific words familiar rules of construction {noscitur a sociis, "it is 
known from its associates," and ejusdem generis, "of the same kind") require that the 
general words be restricted to a sense analogous to the specific words) (citations omitted). 
Moreover, under the "last antecedent rule," "qualifying words and phrases are generally 
regarded as applying to the immediately preceding words, rather than to more remote 
ones." Ferro v. Utah Dept. of Commerce, 828 P.2d 507, 511 (Utah Ct. App. 1992). The 
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Rio has failed to show that it is "in" the museum or Amtrak station, and it has also failed 
to establish that it is "relative to" or "in connection with" the museum or Amtrak station. 
Merriam Webster's Collegiate Dictionary , Tenth Edition at 984. 
An examination of the Rio's lease with the State of Utah reveals that nothing 
distinguishes the Rio from other similarly situated taxpayers. If the construction favored 
by the Rio prevails, it will create a gap in the tax laws contrary to the stated intent of the 
Utah legislature. For this reason, the Board requests that this Court grant its Motion for 
Summary Judgment. 
3- THE RIO'S USE OF THE SUBJECT PROPERTY IS ESCAPED 
PROPERTY BECAUSE THE RIO'S USE OF THE SUBJECT 
PROPERTY IS PROPERTY SUBJECT TO TAXATION WHICH THE 
ASSESSOR ASSESSED TO THE WRONG TAXPAYER FOR THE 
YEARS 1990 TO 1994. 
The Rio's use of the property it leases from the state of Utah is escaped property. 
"'Escaped property' means any property, whether personal, land, or any improvements to 
the property, subject to taxation and is: (i) ... assessed to the wrong taxpayer by the 
assessing authority." Utah Code Annotated § 59-2-102(11) (2002). Moreover, "[a]ny 
escaped property may be assessed by the original assessing authority at any time as far 
back as five years prior to the time of discovery, in which case the assessing authority 
shall enter the assessments on the tax rolls...." Utah Code Annotated § 59-2-217, 309 
(2002). 
The Rio's use of the subject property is "escaped property" because it qualifies as 
"any property ... subject to taxation ... [which was] assessed to the wrong taxpayer." 
Before the Commission, the Rio argued that because the privilege tax is on the "use" of 
8 
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IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
COUNTY BOARD OF EQUALIZATION 
OF SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF 
UTAH, 
Petitioner, 
COUNTY BOARD OF 
EQUALIZATION'S OPPOSITION TO 
THE RIO, INC's CROSS MOTION 
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
-vs-
UTAH TAX COMMISSION EX REL RIO, 
INC. dba RIO GRANDE CAFE, 
Respondents. 
Tax Commission Appeal No. 98-1179 
Case No. 010906152 
Judge: L.A. Dever 
Petitioner County Board of Equalization of Salt Lake County ("Board"), hereby 
submits the following memorandum in opposition to the Cross Motion for Summary 
Judgment submitted by the Respondent Rio, Inc., dba Rio Grande Cafe ("Rio"). 
DISPUTED FACTS 
The Rio admits that it does not dispute the facts as set forth by the Board in its 
Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment. However, the Rio 
introduces several facts arising from irrelevant and otherwise inadmissible evidence and 
submits several other facts the validity of which the Board disputes. The Board set forth 
those facts that the Board contends are inadmissible in its Motion to Strike filed 
concurrently with this Memorandum. This Memorandum addresses those facts that may 
or may not be admissible, but that the Board disputes with accompanying affidavits and 
other evidence. To show that there are material issues of material fact under the Rio's 
theory of the case, the Board has included the lease agreement entered into between the 
State and the Rio ("Lease") (attached hereto as Exhibit A); the affidavits of Max Evans 
(attached hereto as Exhibit B), Alan Andrus (attached hereto as Exhibit C), Alyn 
Lunceford (attached hereto as Exhibit D), and Tom West (attached hereto as Exhibit E); 
and the State Tax Commission's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law (attached 
hereto as Exhibit F). The Board disputes the following facts set forth by the Rio in its 
Cross Motion for Summary Judgment and certain facts alleged in the Rio's 
accompanying affidavits and in the State Tax Commission's Statement of Facts for the 
reasons described below: 
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1. The Board does not dispute that the Rio operates a for-profit restaurant at 
the Denver & Rio Grande Depot ("Depot") or that the State of Utah owns the land, 
building and facilities of the Depot. That the Rio pays personal property taxes on its 
personal property as required under Utah law is not relevant to whether the real property 
the Rio uses is a concession. (Rio Statement of Facts % 1; Board's Motion to Strike at 8-
9) 
2. The Board does not dispute that the State History Museum and Railroad 
station are open as a matter of right to the general public. (Rio Statement of Facts f 2) 
The Board alleges, however, that the State History Museum is not open to the public 
during a significant amount of time that the Rio is open and any overlap in hours between 
the Rio's hours of operation and in the Musuem's hours of operation is coincidental. 
(Max Evans Aff. <|ffl5, 10) During the years in question, the Museum operated from 8:00 
a.m. - 5:00 p.m. on weekdays and 10:00 a.m. - 3:00 p.m. on Saturday. (Utah State Tax 
Commission Findings of Fact f^ 16) Moreover, the Amtrak train, for the years in dispute, 
arrived at the Railroad station twice daily. Neither arrivals nor departures are during the 
hours of operation of either the Museum or the Rio. Train No. 5 arrives at 12:01 a.m. and 
departs at 12:40 a.m. Train No. 6 arrives at 4:40 a.m. and departs at 5:20 a.m. (Utah 
State Tax Commission Findings of Fact f 15) 
3 
3. The Board disputes the assertion that the State intended that the Rio have 
the exclusive right to sell food and drinks at the Denver & Rio Grande Depot at 300 
South State. (Rio Statement of Facts t 3; Peter Henderson Aff. f 3; Milne Aff. ffif 3, 6) 
In fact, the lease clearly states that the "State reserves the right to sell, dispense or 
contract for the sale of food and non-food items in other areas of the building" occupied 
by the Rio and the State. (Lease f 2) The Rio also has no right to provide catering 
services for specially arranged luncheons or banquets held in those parts of the building 
not occupied by the Rio. (Lease f^ 6) There is also no evidence in the lease agreement to 
support the Rio's claim that the State's representative and the Rio's predecessor in 
interest discussed the Rio being a first-class facility in a less than first-class 
neighborhood, that certain standards of service must be met, and that the Rio remain open 
six days per week. (Rio Statement of Facts 13; Peter Henderson Aff. f 2) In fact, the 
Board affirmatively alleges that the Rio does not have any standards of service or other 
obligations to the Utah Division of State History ("Division"), the entity that operates the 
Museum adjacent to the space used by the Rio. The Division has no oversight over the 
use of the property used by the Rio. The use of the space occupied by the Rio is 
independent from, and not in any way connected to, the use of the space occupied by the 
Division including the Museum, its offices, and storage areas. (Max Evans Aff. f 5) 
Moreover, the Division has no authority to require the Rio to use its property in a way 
4 
beneficial to the Museum or its employees and visitors and the Rio is not necessary or 
beneficial to the adjacent Museum. In many important respects, the Rio is a liability to 
the adjacent Museum. (Max Evans Aff. ff 6-8, 10) Furthermore, the lease agreement 
speaks for itself and does not contain any of the provisions that the parties allegedly 
discussed in negotiating the subject contract. (Lease) Finally, to the extent such 
discussions did or did not take place, such evidence is inadmissible because it violates the 
parol evidence rule. (Motion to Strike at 6-8) 
4. The Board does not dispute that the Rio's hours of operation are as stated 
(Rio Statement of Facts 14), but disputes that the Lease limits the Rio's hours of 
operations (Lease) and disputes that its hours of operation are designed to serve visitors 
or employees of the adjacent museum or train station. (See 12 above) 
5. The Board does not dispute that the recitals to the Lease provide as stated 
(Rio Statement of Facts f 5), but the Board alleges that the Lease does not maintain any 
service requirements or time requirements to ensure that the Rio operates for the 
convenience of employees, visitors, and the general public of the State visiting those 
public facilities. (Lease; Tflf 2, 4 above). 
6. The Board does not dispute that the restrooms shared by the Rio and the 
Depot/Museum are included in the Rio's privilege tax assessment (Rio Statement of Facts 
f 6). The Board alleges, however, that the restrooms are open and used by the Rio's 
employees and patrons while the Museum is closed to the public (Tom West Aff. f 10) 
and are used by the Rio in its for-profit business. (Tom West Aff. f 11) 
7. The Board does not dispute that neither the Rio nor the State of Utah had 
any control over the scheduling of the passenger train service to and from Salt Lake City 
provided by Amtrak. (Rio Statement of Facts f 7) The Board contends that this is not 
relevant to whether the use of the space by the Rio constitutes a concession. (Motion to 
Strike at 8-9) 
8. The Board disputes the claim made by Peter Henderson that the lease 
payments made to the state were competitive with privately owned rental space in a 
similar area and that such private lease payments to a private landlord would include an 
amount equivalent to the taxes that a private landlord would use to pay property taxes. 
The Board also disputes Peter Henderson's claim that if the Rio must pay a privilege tax, 
it would amount to double taxation. (Peter Henderson Aff. f 5) The Rio's lease rate was 
below market rents for similar space in the area during the subject time period, (Alan 
Andrus Aff. fflf 4-5), and the Lease contained very favorable provisions in the Rio's 
favor. (Alan Andrus Aff. ff 6, 8). 
9. During the time in question, tenant-restaurateurs leasing from private 
landlords were generally required to pay all property taxes in addition to the base rent and 
that property taxes did not inhere in the base rent of leases in the market during the 
applicable time period. (Alan Andrus Aff. ^ 7) Those leasing space from private 
landlords paid property taxes during the subject years, but the Rio did not pay any real 
property taxes or privilege taxes during the subject years. (Alan Andrus Aff. fflf 7-9) 
10. The Board also disputes the statement of Joyce Milne in her affidavit that 
"it was the intent of the State Building Board in 1981 to seek a suitable concessionaire to 
occupy the north wing of the Denver & Rio Grande Depot Building" (Milne Aff. ^ 3) 
and that the state entered into "an exclusive concession" with the Rio. (Milne Aff. | 6) 
Nothing in the lease indicates that the Rio is a "concession" or that it has an exclusive 
right to operate its for-profit restaurant in the Denver & Rio Grande Depot Building. 
Furthermore, the State Division of Facilities Construction and Maintenance, which is the 
lessor of the premises occupied by the Rio, takes no position on whether the Rio is or is 
not a concession. (Alyn Lunceford Aff. f^ [ 2 -6) The documents attached to Alyn 
Lunceford's Affidavit also demonstrate that the State did not intend for the lessee to be a 
concession. (Alyn Lunceford Aff. attached documents) 
ARGUMENT 
1. THIS COURT SHOULD DENY THE RIP'S CROSS MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT BECAUSE THERE ARE GENUINE ISSUES 
OF MATERIAL FACT UNDER THE RIP'S THEORY OF THE CASE. 
Because the Board disputes several of the material facts the Rio sets forth to 
support its theory in its Cross Motion for Summary Judgment, this Court should deny the 
Rio's Cross Motion for Summary Judgment. Rule 56(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure provides that summary judgment is only appropriate "if the pleadings, 
depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the 
affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact...." 
Because the lease agreement at issue in this case does not contain any material 
service requirements, hours of operation, or other obligations that would qualify the Rio 
as a concessionaire under the case law cited by the Board in its Motion for Summary 
Judgment, the Rio has attempted to inject such provisions into the lease by relying on 
unsubstantiated legal conclusions that the State sought out a "concessionaire" (Joyce 
Milne Aff. ffif 3,4, and 6), and other lease provisions that plainly are not in the lease. 
(Peter Henderson Aff. ffl[ 1-3) Furthermore, the Rio attempts to paint a picture of itself as 
a restaurant that is in operation for the sole purpose of serving the public good, the State 
Historical Society and its employees and patrons, and the Train Station and its employees 
and patrons at a sacrifice to itself. The facts set forth by the Board disputes this notion. 
The lease does not grant the Rio the exclusive right to serve food at the Depot, as 
required by the case law cited by the Board, so the Rio tries to inject the concept of 
exclusivity into the lease through Peter Henderson (Peter Henderson Aff. f 3) and Joyce 
Milne (Joyce Milne Aff. fflf 3, 6)(Disputed Facts f 3). The lease does not contain the 
specific obligations normally inherent in a concession, so the Rio has tried to inject 
obligations into the lease agreement that do not exist. (Peter Hendeson Aff. fflf 1-3; 
Disputed Facts | 3) The lease itself is not characterized as a concession, so the Rio 
attempts to have a former employee of the state characterize it as such, even though the 
State has not taken a position on whether the Rio is or is not a concessionaire under Utah 
law. (Joyce Milne Aff 1fl[ 3 - 4, 6; Alyn Lunceford Aff. | 6; Disputed Facts f 10) 
The Board has clearly set forth admissible and competent evidence to show a 
material issue of material fact under the Rio's theory of the case. As the Utah Court of 
Appeals stated: "cross-motions [for summary judgment] may be viewed as involving a 
contention by each movant that no genuine issue of material fact exists under the theory it 
advances, but not as a concession that no dispute remains under the theory advanced by 
its adversary." Wycalis v. Guardian Title, 780 P.2d 821, 825 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). 
Likewise, the Board contends, and the Rio agrees, that the facts it sets forth under its 
theory of the case are undisputed. (Rio's Memorandum in Opposition to the Board's 
Motion for Summary Judgment at 1) However, it is clear that the facts set forth under the 
Rio's theory of the case have been adequately disputed by the Board. For this reason, the 
Board respectfully requests that this Court deny the Rio's Cross-Motion for Summary 
Judgment. 
2. THIS COURT SHOULD DENY THE RIO'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT BECAUSE THE RIO IS NOT ENTITLED TO 
JUDGMENT AS A MATTER OF LAW, 
The Rio is not entitled to judgment as a matter of law under its theory of this case. 
Rule 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides that summary judgment is 
appropriate when "the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." As the 
Board's disputed facts show herein, the Board disputes the Rio's portrayal of itself as a 
restaurant whose purpose is to serve the public good akin to services provided by a 
municipal entity. The Rio is clearly a for-profit restaurant that has avoided paying taxes 
on the use of its property that its competitors have to pay, giving it a clear advantage over 
such competitors and in direct contradiction of the stated purpose behind the privilege 
tax. Great Salt Lake Minerals & Chemical Corp. v. State Tax Comm'n, 573 P.2d 337, 
339 (Utah 1977)("the obvious legislative intention was to close any gaps in the tax laws 
by imposing a tax on any property possessed or used in connection with a business for-
profit which was otherwise exempt from taxation"). 
The favorable terms of the lease between the Rio and the State already give the 
Rio an advantage over its competitors (Alan Andrus Aff. f| 4-9), and hardly justify 
allowing the Rio to transfer its share of the tax burden onto other taxpayers. The 
concession exemption is designed to assist those encumbered by specific obligations of 
service and time, not to benefit for-profit restaurants that coincidentally share space with 
a public institution, especially when the Rio presents little or no benefit to the adjacent 
Museum and train station, and has at times presented liabilities. (Max Evans Aff. fflf 4-
10) 
Because the Board has demonstrated that there are material issues of material fact 
under the Rio's theory of the case, and because the Rio is not entitled to a judgment as a 
matter of law, the Board respectfully requests that this Court deny the Rio's Cross 
Motion for Summary Judgment. 
DATED this i ^ T day of February, 2003. 
DAVID E. YOCOM 
Salt Lake County District Attorney 
jQjN S.R 
S. pa-*-
JAS ^J . OSE 
Deputy District Attorney 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
THIS IS TO CERTIFY that I mailed, via first class mail, a copy of the Petitioner's 
Opposition to the Rio's Cross Motion for Summary Judgment to the following, postage 
prepaid, this iffl day of February, 2003. 
John W. Call 
Nygaard, Coke & Vincent, L.C. 
333 North 300 West 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84103 
Timothy A. Bodily 
Asst. Attorney General 
160 East 300 South, #500 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
Utah State Tax Commission 
210 North 1950 West 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84134 
A 
DAVID E. YOCOM 
Salt Lake County District Attorney 
MARY ELLEN SLOAN (#2980) 
Deputy District Attorney 
JASON S. ROSE (#8593) 
Deputy District Attorney 
2001 South State #S3600 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84190-1200 
Telephone: (801)468-3267 
Attorneys for Petitioner 
IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
COUNTY BOARD OF EQUALIZATION 
OF SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF : AFFIDAVIT OF MAX J. EVANS 
UTAH, 
: Tax Commission Appeal No. 01-1041 
Petitioner, 
Civil No. 010906152 
v. 
: Judge L.A. Dever 
UTAH TAX COMMISSION EX REL RIO 
INC. dba RIO GRANDE CAFE, : 
Respondent. : 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: SS. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
Max J. Evans being duly sworn upon oath states as follows: 
1. I am at least eighteen years old and I am currently the Director of the 
Utah Division of State History ("Division"). My office is located at 300 Rio Grande in 
Salt Lake City, Utah; 
2. I have served as the Director for the Utah Division of State History 
for fifteen years; 
3. The Rio Grande Cafe ("Rio") occupies and uses space rented from 
the State of Utah adjacent to space used by the Division. The Rio occupies and uses such 
space to operate a restaurant. The Division occupies and uses its space for a public 
museum; a public bookstore; offices; and storage space used to store historical 
documents, books, manuscripts, photos, and artifacts related to the purposes of the 
Division; 
4. Besides the restrooms and a connecting hallway, which separate the 
space used by the Rio from the space used by the Division, the Rio does not occupy or 
use any space within the confines of the space used by the Division. The restrooms serve 
both patrons to the museum and patrons to the Rio; 
5. The Rio is not essential or necessary to the operation of the museum, 
the offices, or the storage areas operated by the Division. The use of the space occupied 
by the Rio is independent from, and not in any way connected to, the use of the space 
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occupied by the Division, including the museum, its offices, and storage areas. There is 
no access from the Rio to the museum after the museum closes at 5:00 p.m. on the 
weekdays or at 3:00 p.m. on Saturdays; 
6. The use of the Rio as a restaurant poses a substantial risk of fire 
and/or water damage to the space and materials kept by the Division. Any residual 
benefit provided by the use of the Rio as a restaurant is offset by such risk. The Division 
has previously incurred costs to clean up damage from flooding as a result of the Rio's 
use of the property it leases from the State of Utah. This damage arose from use of the 
restaurant after the museum's normal operating hours; 
7. The Division stores and displays many historically significant 
materials that would be difficult, if not impossible, to replace if damaged or destroyed; 
8. The Division has use for the space currently used by the Rio; 
9. While the use of the Rio as a restaurant does increase traffic to the 
museum operated by the Division, nobody has quantified the effect of such increase on 
the museum and I would describe any such effect as marginal. Nothing indicates that 
traffic to the museum benefits the Rio; 
10. The hours of operation of the museum and the Rio do not fully 
coincide and any overlap in hours is coincidental. The Rio does not have any obligations 
to the Division. The Division has no oversight of the use of the property used by the Rio, 
J 
and has no authority to require the Rio to use its propen\ in .iH•l i \, \, hetH•f u• i,i 
Division or the use of the property used by the Division; 
11 1 ha \ e pei sonal kno vledge of the statenients made herein. 
DATED this / j £ day of February, 2002. 
J. F t *.V-MAX 
Director 
Utah Division of State History 
Subscribed and Sworn to me this iA day of February, 2002. 
Notary Puttie ~ *1 
JANICE HEED-CAMPBELL, 
300RJoGfind» I 
Salt Lake City, Utan 8410M182 
My Commission Exptos ( 
Fsfcrua/y 7,2005 
Mv I Yirnniissinn Expires: 
L/\ISC> / ; ^OD^T V 
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Rio's lease with the state, but that Alyn Lunceford, as a DCFM "manager," does not have 
authority to take "no position" as to whether the Rio constitutes a concession. The difference 
between the Lunceford Affidavit and the Milne Affidavit is that Alyn Lunceford does not make 
impermissible legal conclusions and Milne does, which is one reason why the Board argues that 
Milne's Affidavit should be striken in its Motion to Strike. (Board's Motion to Strike at 5) For 
the reasons set forth herein, the Board requests that this Court deny the Rio's Motion to Strike ff 
4-6 of the Lunceford Affidavit. 
2. Because Max Evans5 testimony reflects the relationship between the Rio and the 
State History Museum during his tenure, which included the relevant lien dates 
of January 1,1990 through January 1,1995, his so-called "stale" testimony is 
especially relevant as it applies to this case. 
The Max Evans Affidavit (the "Evans Affidavit") signed by him on February 1, 2002, 
during his tenure as Director of the Utah Division of State History, reflects the relationship 
between the Rio and the Division of State History during his tenure and the years in question in 
this dispute. This testimony speaks to the existence of facts "of consequence to the 
determination of the action" because it applies to the time period between January 1, 1990 and 
January 1, 1995, the relevant time period in this case. Utah R. Evid. 401. 
The Rio argues that the Evans Affidavit includes opinions that "are stale and irrelevant, 
as he could not now testify in any official capacity to his official opinion at the present time." 
(Rio Motion to Strike at 3) Mr. Evans so called "stale" opinions, however, are especially 
relevant to show that the Museum he directed had no authority to impose specific obligations on 
the Rio to benefit the public's use of the State History Museum, and to show that the use of the 
subject property by the Rio was not "relative to" the use of the Museum from 1990 - 1995, the 
relevant time period in this dispute. The Rio fails to explain why events on which it relies, which 
4 
Evans ' tenure as director of the State History Museum, which included the relevant tax years, are 
not. (Evans Aff 1 2 ) Moreover, by arguing that "[lease] Amendment N umber 3, w hich the 
[Board] will agree speaks for itself, effectively disclaims the validity of Mr. Evans' opinions" 
(Rio Motion to Strike Affidavit at 3), the Rio would have this Court impermissibly weigh the 
1;< tli •' • 4 1 1: : •• • is !| ffida < it. and not its i elei ance Spoi v Crested Butte Silver Mining Co., 
"-i»» i> .:.; ^, 1308 (Utah 1987)(stating that in summary judgment proceedings that trial court 
appropriate for court to weigh disputed evidence, only to determine whether material issues of 
•fact existsVciting WM. Barnes Co. v. Sohio Natural Resources Co., 62 7 P.2d 56, 59 ( Utah 
1981)). 
Therefore, because the Evans Affidavit "is of consequence to the determination" of 
w liethei the R io cp lalified as "a concession in. , • :>i reiatii • e to. the i ise r of the State Histon > 
Museum for the relevant time period, the Evans Affidavit is admissible as it applies to the Rio's 
Evans Affidavit. Utah R. Evid. 401; Utah Code Annotated § 59-4-101(3)(a) (2002). 
3. Alan Andrus' statements are relevant to dispute statements set forth by the Rio 
as material facts in the First Henderson Affidavit. 
I he Man !"!l|i ndi us \ ffida> it (the ' \ iicli us i \ ffida It" ") Is rele\ a lit t : disp i ite mai ket 
conditions claimed to exist by Peter Henderson in the First Henderson Affidavit, and to dispute 
whether the Rio would be subject to "double taxation" if this Coui t finds that tl le Rio is subject 
to the privilege tax imposed on for-profit businesses which use otherwise exempt property. 
(First Henderson A fi H 5) The Rio criticizes the Board for attempting to introduce evidence to 
5 
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reviewed the two volumes that I received, as well as the reply-
on the affidavits that I received on Friday, I believe. 
MR. ROSE: Thank you, your Honor. 
May it please the Court, Salt Lake County has filed 
a motion for summary judgment on this tax dispute with the Rio 
Grande Cafe. The County—the County believes that it is 
entitled to summary judgment because there are no genuine 
issues of material fact and because the issues presented to 
this Court are (inaudible). 
The County's motion for summary judgment, the—the 
evidence we presented in support of that motion consists— 
THE COURT: Now, Mr. Rose, that thing goes up and 
down if it's—I mean the whole podium goes up and down if it's 
too far down or too far up. There's just a little button by 
your waist that you can move it up and down if you'd like. 
MR. ROSE: Oh. 
THE COURT: The bailiff will show you how to do it 
if you'd like. 
MR. ROSE: Okay. Thank you, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Sometimes tall people have a problem 
with it. 
MR. ROSE: Can you hear me okay? 
THE COURT: I can hear you fine. 
MR. ROSE: The—as I was saying, your Honor, we 
believe that there are—there are no issues of material fact 
Kler t h e 
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connection with a business conducted for profit. I don't 
think the parties dispute that the Rio falls under that 
language. 
Where the dispute occurs is in Section 3. A tax i s 
not imposed under this chapter on the following: The use of 
property which is a concession in or relative to the use of a 
public airport, park, fairground or similar property which is 
available as a matter of right to the use of the general 
public. 
I don't think the parties dispute whether the Rio or 
the museum or the Amtrax station are open as a matter of right 
to the general public. I believe that the—the dispute is— 
relates to the first part of that statute, the use of property 
which is a concession in or relative to the use of the public 
facility. 
I think there are two cardinal principles of 
taxation in Utah that we need to look at when determining if a 
party is subject or is—is able to receive a tax exemption. 
In Utah, all property is declared taxable unless otherwise 
exempt. 
The privilege tax was imposed to insure equality. 
The Supreme Court says that the purpose of the privilege tax 
is to close any gaps in the tax law between owners of property 
and lessees of property. It was unfair that a business who 
owned its property had to pay taxes where a lessee who was 
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M) i lnu. i JH'.V. f i | it I M "lid not. S^ ^ ^ 
^etjisidtaie imposed the privilege tax with some of these 
exemptions. 
exemptions are to be strictly 
-cnstrued against the taxpaye: Burden'^ ^e taxpayer and 
3, ' im-t reasonable 
controversy about its meaning since dix doubts must be 
resolved against un« 
The County tne County does not believe that the 
language relied upor \-\ r--.f- ^\ \- so clear as not to admit of 
a reasonat c n - i , 11 H n 11 i i iiiiih " a 1 1 1 1 i g , 
COURT: The language you rely upon is in the 
c-ase agreement, LST '-
! !Ji I , " c » 1 1 r 1 t v s pos111on is, it's 
,r-h r> plain lease agreement, "There I s — t h e r e are no specific 
obi ig^" i or--*. . - r ^ i <=: agreement wh i cl l wc i :i 1; :I make :i t a 
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:;om Michigan and :,v» reason the County has done that i s the 
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• i t«|d 11 LJ tatute ii i di af ting its statute, 
THE COURT: Well, but haven't we got this Interwest 
case that sort of gives us the standard f"hat w« SII lppnscil I 
MR. ROSE: The Interwest c a s e — 
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THE COURT: The three-prong test? 
MR. ROSE: I think the Interwest case is very 
general. It states that you have to—first, you have to fall 
under the privilege tax itself in order to qualify for the 
exemption. And it states general if—if it isn't— 
THE COURT: Well, there isn't any question that this 
is privilege tax, is there? 
MR. ROSE: No. I don't—there's no question at all. 
The—the problem with the Interwest case, for our purposes, 
is, it doesn't define concession and it doesn't explain what a 
party needs to do to—to prove that—its agreement with the 
exempt entity is a—is a concession. 
So, for that reason, the County has turned to the 
Michigan cases because, one, they have the same rules of 
statutory construction, the statutory language is the same and 
Michigan also—the Michigan cases have the same policies that 
the cases in Utah talk about, the quality and uniformity of 
taxation, making sure that the gaps in the tax laws are—are 
closed. 
There are a couple of Michigan cases I'd like to 
bring to the Court's attention, if I may. 
THE COURT: Uh huh. 
MR. ROSE: May I approach, your Honor? 
THE COURT: You may. 
MR. ROSE: This is a Michigan case from 1996 that 
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deals with a—a golf course that claimed, much like the Rio, 
that it qualified for the concession agreement. 
I would like to read some of the fourth page and I 
think I've starred it. 
THE COURT: Yes. 
MR. ROSE: I believe that this explanation by the 
Court is—applies to this case or is—it's very similar. 
The provisions in the lease contract between the 
parties do not rise to the level of specific obligations on 
the part of petitioner, the privileged party, to main 
particular—to maintain particular services at specified 
times. The provisions do not include requirements for minimum 
hours of operation or petitioner's standard of service or for 
respondent's oversight of the golf course operations. 
I believe like in this case, the State is basically 
turning the operations over to the Rio. They've given them 
basic lease obligations they need to abide by that any other 
lessee would have to—to also fall under. 
While the lease provisions demonstrate that 
respondent had some control over the operations, the 
provisions address broader management issues rather than 
specific obligations. For example, the lease in this case 
provides that respondent has the right to change the prices 
charged by petitioner. 
The State in this case, your Honor, and the Rio has-
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-has no ability to—to oversee the—the prices of goods that 
the Rio sells. 
And the Semore court observed, however, that the 
oversight of fees charged to the public is not strenuous. In 
this case, they're non-existent, in the Rio. Likewise, in 
this case, respondent had the right to inspect and regulate 
the maintenance of the property. The Semore court stated that 
the maintenance was consistent with—consistent with the 
city's goal in protecting the property and that it did not 
exact a specific term or service for the public benefit. 
Next page. Also, the record does not contain 
evidence that the purchase of the golf course was reasonably 
related to the public purposes of respondent city. I think 
that if you look at this particular lease, your Honor, the— 
there is nothing in the lease that ties the Rio to the museum. 
It—it is next to the museum, but if you took the museum away, 
there would be nothing in the lease to change because the 
museum and the Rio are not tied up in any way in this 
agreement. 
It appears that respondent merely privatized the 
operation of the golf course, thereby permitting petitioner to 
have an unfair advantage over entities leasing privately owned 
property. Granting a concession exception to petitioner's 
golf course would thus be contrary to the purpose of the 
lessee user tax act. 
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1 I Likewise, in—in the reading—in this case, your 
2 (Honor, there's nothing in this lease agreement between the Rio 
3 | and the State that distinguishes the Rio from—from other 
4 (taxpayers; therefore, the Rio would have an unfair advantage 
5 I over entities leasing privately owned property, such as other 
6 ! restaurants in the neighborhood. 
7 THE COURT: Well, the contract says that the State 
8 desires to have a restaurant operated in the location for the 
9 convenience of employees, visitors and the general public of 
10 the State. You agree with that, don't you? 
11 MR. ROSE: Yes. I do. 
12 THE COURT: Okay. And isn't that really all that a 
13 concession is is a grant? 
14 MR. ROSE: Under the plain language of—of the word 
15 "concession" in the dictionary, I—I concede that it is just a 
16 grant and— 
17 THE COURT: And if all the—all the State has to do 
18 to establish a concession is to give a grant, then what more 
19 do I need to look at? 
20 MR. ROSE: That's a very fair question, your Honor. 
21 I believe that if you interpret the statute that way, that it 
22 sill defeat the purpose of the privilege tax. 
23 THE COURT: Why? 
24 MR. ROSE: If the Rio—if there's nothing to 
25 distinguish the Rio from other lessees as far as the economic 
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reality of their—their whole purpose, then you are treating 
two similarly-situated entities differently for no material 
reason. 
The Rio is not competing against restaurants at the 
airport or—it's competing against restaurants in the 
community. I think if you construe the statute the way you 
just expressed, which is basically the—the Rio's argument, it 
goes against the spirit of—of the tax laws in Utah, that 
people be treated uniformly and— 
THE COURT: So, you're saying that because the 
airport is sort of a closed system and everybody at the 
airport is on the same playing field, that that's something 
that I should consider in deciding whether or not the Rio 
Grande is a concession or not? 
MR. ROSE: I think so, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Another point, your Honor, the—the 
statute requires more than just the concession agreement. It 
requires a concession—I want to get the language perfectly— 
the use of property which is a concession in or relative to 
the use of another public facility. And I think that's where 
the specific obligations come in, the—why give a tax 
exemption here? Why would the legislature want to make an 
exception for concessions? 
If you read the Michigan cases, I think it's because 
the concession's coming in and doing something that the State 
12 
would otherwise have to do for a public purpose. 
In this case, there's nothing in the agreement 
besides the one recital we recited which requires the Rio to 
provide a public service that's relative to the—the museum. 
THE COURT: Well, I mean, their agreement is, is 
that we have this huge public facility that has a museum and 
it has other—an art gallery, and visitors come there and 
people work there. And it would be appropriate, the State 
thinks, to have a restaurant there for the convenience of 
those visitors and employees. 
And because the State thinks that would be of 
benefit to the citizens, it grants to the Rio Grande the right 
to have a restaurant; does it not? 
MR. ROSE: And I agree with that. I think it is 
totally appropriate to have a restaurant in that location. I 
think that the reason the Rio should not get a tax exemption 
is that the State just turned the entire operation over to the 
Rio and it says, here you go, we want you to run a restaurant 
and that is an obligation that they do have to abide by, but 
otherwise, we're going to turn the operation over to you. 
There's another— 
THE COURT: Well, could this—couldn't the State 
have said when it entered into the contract with the Rio 
Grande, that—that we specifically determine that this is not 
to be viewed as a concession and you are not a concessionaire 
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for the purposes of the statute? 
MR. ROSE: The State could have said that. The 
State could— 
THE COURT: And we wouldn't have a problem if they 
said that, would we? 
MR. ROSE: I think we'd still have to look at the 
actual terms of the agreement. I don't think— 
THE COURT: Well, if that's what they said in the 
agreement, we wouldn't have a problem; right? 
MR. ROSE: If they said we— 
THE COURT: If they said in the contract that they 
signed with the Rio Grande, for the purposes of this—this 
contract, this is not to be viewed as a concession for 
exemptions under the tax code. 
MR. ROSE: I'm not sure I would agree with that, 
your Honor, because then you could have—this actually goes 
into a—another argu—another case, if I may. 
THE COURT: Uh huh. 
MR. ROSE: This is the Semore versus Dalton 
(inaudible). On Page 3, I'd like to skip down to the blocked 
quote and the—here's the—the court—the court explaining its 
notion of a concession. The notion of a concession is that of 
a subsidiary business related to a public oriented operation. 
A holding to the contrary that would allow for a self-
contained public entity leased to the private sector to 
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qualify as a concession, would give carte blanche to a 
governmental unit to lease out for profit one of any number of 
jgovernmental enterprises and with minimal operations on its 
operation, gain for it a favored tax status by simply 
denominating it a concession. 
I think there are certain requirements that have to 
be met before the—the substantive obligations in the 
concession that need to be met in order for it to fall within 
the public—the purpose of the statute. 
The construction that you stated or just calling a 
concession a grant swallows the privilege tax rule. If we're 
trying to put—close the gaps in the tax law, it doesn't make 
sense to just call something a concession while ignoring its 
substantive provisions to insure that it's actually 
accomplishing a public purpose. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
Anything further? 
MR. ROSE: I would just like to in—on that issue, 
in conclusion, I think that if you look at the Rio, it's 
leasing the property from the State and it happens to be an 
(inaudible) facility. There's really no evidence presented 
that it's there in order to enhance or that it's somehow 
relative to the museum. There's nothing in the agreement 
itself that ties the use of the Rio to the use of the museum 
or the use of the Amtrax station. 
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And I think that granting the Rio the concessionaire 
exemption in this case would violate the spirit and the—the 
principles of the tax law that everyone be treated uniformly 
and equally. 
THE COURT: Would you say—I mean, we look at—we 
look at the—this place originally went into business 20-some 
years ago; right? 1981? 
MR. ROSE: 1981, that's correct. 
THE COURT: And when it went into business in 1981, 
the area where it was located was a fairly run-down section of 
the city, was it not? 
MR. ROSE: I was eleven years old at the time. 
THE COURT: You don't know? 
Well, I think there's some—there's some— 
MR. ROSE: I've heard—I've heard as much, your 
Honor. 
THE COURT: There's some information in the file 
that indicates that this was not exactly the nicest part of 
Salt Lake City. 
MR. ROSE: Correct. 
THE COURT: And the facilities—there were no 
facilities for the public, to speak of. And the government 
decided it wanted to make the Rio Grande station a—a place 
where the public would feel comfortable going to, put a museum 
there, the trains came there. And that in order to entice the 
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public, so to speak, they would put a restaurant there for the 
public to eat, so that if they did go to the museum and spend 
several hours there, they would have a place that they could 
go to eat and the employees who worked there would have a 
place they could feel safe going to, having a meal without 
trekking long distances. 
And so therefore, they gave the Rio Grande the right 
to open a restaurant there for the benefit of employees, 
visitors and the general public. If that was the purpose 
stated in it, then why shouldn't it be viewed as a grant and 
organization simply because today, in this day and age, the 
original intent may have changed—I shouldn't say the original 
intent, the—the basis for the original intent may have 
changed, doesn't change the original intent, does it? 
MR. ROSE: Well, first off, I'm not absolutely 
certain that all the facts that you've set forth are—are true 
and correct facts. I—I don't have any facts in opposition to 
those and as I said, I was eleven years old at that time, so 
I—I don't know what the—but your point is well taken. 
And I think that again, the County disagrees with 
the construction, the statutory construction of calling a 
concession a grant. I think that it defeats the purpose of 
the statute, and we believe that the principle, under 
principles of statutory construction, there should be—we 
would urge the Court to follow the specific obligation 
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requirements set forth in the Michigan case. 
I—I don't see how turning—merely turning the 
restaurant over to the Rio to operate in the market, to 
compete against other similarly situated persons justifies 
granting the Rio special tax treatment— 
THE COURT: Uh huh. 
MR. ROSE: —unless the State has some oversight 
over the way the Rio is run. 
THE COURT: Okay. Very well. 
MR. ROSE: And I believe that's our argument. 
THE COURT: Thank you very much, Mr. Rose. 
MR. ROSE: The other issues that we've raised deals 
with escaped property, if you do find that the Rio is subject 
to the privilege tax. We have entered into a dispute as to 
whether we—whether the County has statutory authority to 
appendix the prior five years or to assess the—the value of 
the Rio's property interest, I believe it's for '91 through 
'94, it may be '90 through '94, your Honor. 
The—Rio has argued that there's a difference 
between property tax and privilege tax. I concede that point 
and the County's never argued that we have a lien on the 
property through—through the privilege tax; but I think that 
if you look at the definition— 
THE COURT: Well, actually—actually, Mr. Rose, you 
don't have to spend a lot of time on this, because I—their 
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ADDENDUM E 
Rio's Memorandum in Opposition to County's Motion for Summary Judgment and 
in Support of Rio's Motion for Summary Judgment, 
pp. 8-9; R. at 259-60 
kitchen and dining area located in the north wing" (Lease Agreement, p. 1, attached as 
Exhibit "B") of the Depot, to provide the particular services of "a food preparation and 
dispensing facility" (p. 1) and "as a restaurant/cafeteria" (p. 2), "for the convenience of 
employees, visitors, and the general public of the State" (p.l). In doing so, the lessee must 
meet a particular standard to "provide a sufficient number of employees to provide prompt, 
efficient service" (p. 6). Thus, five of the six Tygard "incidents of a concession" are found 
in the Rio's lease. Only a specific provision for operating hours is not found. Nor is one 
necessary, since market pressures and human appetites are sufficient to insure the Rio 
Grande Cafe will be open when people usually eat lunch and dinner, and there is no 
question that the Cafe has always been open at such times. 
It is worth mentioning the effect of § 17A-2-1523, Utah Code. This statute, enacted 
after the Interwest Aviation opinion, specifically exempts from the privilege tax "any [airport 
authority] property leased, rented or granted by way of a concession . . . " (emphasis added). 
§ 17A-2-1523 does not create new exemptions, it simply stands as the Legislature's 
affirmation of the exemptions available to concessionaires and their "relative[s]" under § 59-
4-101(3)(a). This view of § 17A-2-1523 requires no contortions, since similar statutes must 
be construed in harmony and to avoid conflicts. See, e.g. Div. of Unclaimed Property v. 
McKay Dee Credit Union, 958 P.2d 234, 238 (Utah 1998), and De Baritault v. Salt Lake City 
Corp., 913 P.2d 743, 747 (Utah 1996). See also, Malan v. Lewis, 693 P.2d 661, 670 (Utah 
1984) ("a law must apply equally to all persons of a class") (citing State Tax Commission v. 
Dept. of Finance, 576 P.2d 1297 (Utah 1978)). 
-8-
Finally, the County urges an interpretation of the privilege tax exemption that reads 
the phrase "or relative to" right out of § 57-4-101(3)(a). If the Cafe's lease with the state and 
exclusive use of the north wing of the Depot is not a concession under the County's 
Michigan-flavored interpretation, it is most certainly is "relative to, the use of a public 
airport, park, fairground, or similar property." 
II. 
THE "ESCAPED PROPERTY" 
PROVISIONS DO NOT APPLY. 
The County attempts to invoke the"escaped property" provisions found in § 59-2-3C9, 
Utah Code (1995 amendment)5 of the Property Tax Act (§ 59-2-101, et. seq.,) in order to 
collect five previous years' worth of a non-property tax imposed in a separate statute. By 
doing so, the County confuses apples and oranges and ignores the fundamental distinctions 
between a property tax and a privilege tax. 
A property tax is a tax assessed against the physical property6 itself (e.g., § 59-2-301), 
creating a lien on real property (§ 59-2-1325), which lien is enforced by the sale of the 
property itself (§ 59-2-1353). On the other hand the privilege tax is a tax "imposed on the 
possession or other beneficial use'' of exempt property (§ 59-4-101(l)(a), emphasis added), 
5
 The 1995 version of the Code is cited, because although the escaped property definition has not materially 
changed, there were subsequent additions to the definitions that may be material here 
6
 § 59-2-102(19), Utah Code ('95 amendment), defined "property," which specifically did not include certain 
items and "other intangibles " The Property Tax Act was subsequently amended to mclude a separate 
definition for "intangible property" (§ 59-2-102(17), Utah Code (2002 amendment)), which definition provides 
an inclusive, not exclusive, list This list of items is not identical to the '95 listed items 
-9-
ADDENDUM F 
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, 
p. 5; R. at 578 
Oral Argument 
p. 27; R. at 659 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. The threshold determination to be made by the Court is the meaning of the 
term "concession" as that term is used in the privilege tax statute. 
2. This Court is obligated to apply the ordinary and accepted meaning of the 
language of the statute. The Court cannot go beyond the plain and unambiguous language 
of subparagraph (3) of the privilege tax exemptions statute. 
3. The Court concludes that the proper definition of the term "concession" is a 
grant, by a government entity, of property to be put to a particular use. Accordingly, the 
various affidavits submitted by the parties are unnecessary for the Court to determine 
whether the lease at issue here constitutes a "concession" under the privilege tax exemption 
statute. The Court makes no determination as to the admissibility or persuasiveness of such 
affidavits since they did not raise factual issues that influence or change the plain meaning 
of the term "concession." 
4. The Cafe's lease with the State constitutes a concession since the use of the 
exempt property in the Depot by the Cafe was for a particular purpose, i.e., a restaurant. 
As the restaurant was also open and available to the general public as per the lease, and as 
the Depot, which contains the museum and train station, is public property similar to a 
public airport, park, or fairground, the Cafe therefore meets the requirements of § 59-4-
101(3)(a), Utah Code, and is exempt from the imposition of the privilege tax. 
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;to the Board's motion for summary judgment. It says on Page 3 
that while the plain statute—the plain language of the 
statute does support the theory of the case espoused by the 
Rio, such an interpretation defeats the purpose behind the 
privilege tax statute. 
And they're asking this Court here to defeat the 
literal wording and impose what they believe is the intent of 
the Legislature. Well, I don't believe that I have a right to 
go beyond the statute when a statute is clear on its face. 
The interpretation of the statute is clear and the directions 
given by the Supreme Court to judges in this State says that 
when the statute is clear and unambiguous, it's to be 
enforced. I'm not to look behind unless it is ambiguous. 
It's certainly not ambiguous in this case. 
The State said in its contract, it owns a facility 
and it is desirous of having a restaurant-cafeteria operated 
at said location for the convenience of employees, visitors 
and general public of the State. 
Under any interpretation, that is a grant—a grant 
of a concession in the eyes of this Court and therefore, 
summary judgment in this matter will be granted to the Rio 
Grande in this case finding that it is a concessionaire and 
therefore exempt from the tax sought to be imposed by the 
County. 
Mr. Call, I want you to draft a proper order in this 
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ADDENDUM G 
Utah Code Ann. § 59-2-103(21)(a)(1995) 
UTAH CODE 
UNANNOTATED 
1995 
VOLUME 3 
Complete through the 
1995 FIRST SPECIAL SESSION 
MICHIE BUTTERWORTH 
Law Publishers 
Charlottesville, Virginia 
59-2-103 REVENUE AND TAXATION 
(18) "Personal property" includes: 
(a) every class of property as denned in Subsection 
(19) which is the subject of ownership and not in-
cluded within the meaning of the terms "real estate" 
and "improvements"; 
(b) gas and water mains and pipes laid in roads, 
streets, or alleys; 
(c) bridges and ferries; and 
(d) livestock which, for the purposes of the exemp-
tion provided under Section 59-2-1112, means all 
domestic animals, honeybees, poultry, fur-bearing 
animals, and fish. 
(19) "Property" means property which is subject to 
assessment and taxation according to its value, but does 
not include moneys, credits, bonds, stocks, representative 
property, franchises, goodwill, copyrights, patents, or 
other intangibles. 
(20) "Public utility," for purposes of this chapter, means 
the operating property of a railroad, common carrier, gas 
corporation, oil or gas transportation or pipeline company, 
coal slurry pipeline company, electrical corporation, tele-
phone corporation, sewerage corporation, or heat corpora-
tion where the company performs the service for, or 
delivers the commodity to, the public generally or compa-
nies serving the public generally, or in the case of a gas 
corporation or an electrical corporation, where the gas or 
electricity is sold or furnished to any member or consum-
ers within the state for domestic, commercial, or indus-
trial use. Public utility also means the operating property 
of any entity or person defined under Section 54-2-1 
except warehousemen and water corporations. 
(21) "Real estate or property" includes: 
(a) the possession of, claim to, ownership of, or 
right to the possession of land; 
(b) all mines, minerals, and quarries in and under 
the land, all timber belonging to individuals or cor-
porations growing or being on the lands of this state 
or the United States, and all rights and privileges 
appertaining to these; and 
(c) improvements. 
(22) "Residential property," for the purposes of the 
reductions and adjustments under this chapter, means 
any property used for residential purposes as a primary 
residence. It does not include property used for transient 
residential use or condominiums used in rental pools. 
(23) "Taxable value" means fair market value less any 
applicable reduction allowed for residential property un-
der Section 59-2-103. 
(24) "Taxing entity" means any county, city, town, 
school district, special taxing district, or any other politi-
cal subdivision of the state with the authority to levy a tax 
on property. 
(25) "Tax roll" means a permanent record of the taxes 
charged on property, as extended on the assessment roll 
and may be maintained on the same record or records as 
the assessment roll or may be maintained on a separate 
record properly indexed to the assessment roll. It includes 
tax books, tax lists, and other similar materials. 1995 
59-2-103. Rate of a s s e s s m e n t of property — Residential 
property. 
(1) All tangible taxable property shall be assessed and 
taxed at a uniform and equal rate on the basis of its fan-
market value, as valued on January 1, unless otherwise 
provided by law. 
(2) Beginning January 1, 1995, the fair market value of 
residential property shall be reduced by 45%, representing a 
residential exemption allowed under Utah Constitution Ar-
ticle XIII, Section 2, Utah Constitution. 
(3) No more than one acre of land per residential uniJ 
qualify for the residential exemption. 
59-2-104. S i tus of property for tax purposes . 
(1) The situs of all taxable property is the tax area wKja 
is located. ^ 
(2) Personal property, unless assessed by the co] _ ^ ^ 
shall be assessed in the tax area where the owner is domfrj 
in this state on January 1, unless the owner demonstrate 
the satisfaction of the county assessor that the penS 
property is usually kept in a tax area other than that tJJ 
domicile of the owner, in which case that property " 
assessed in the other tax area. \u 
(3) Land shall be assessed in parcels or subdivisions! 
exceeding 640 acres each, and tracts of land containing 
than 640 acres, which have been sectioned by the ~ 
States government, shall be assessed by sections or 
of sections. 
(4) The following property shall be listed and asi 
the county where the property is located: 
(a) public utilities, when operated wholly in i 
county; 1 
(b) bridges and ferries which are not public uulitj 
when operated wholly in one county; 1 
(c) electric light lines and similar improvements; a 
(d) canals, ditches, and flumes when separately fa 
able. J 
59-2-105. Situs of public utilities, bridges, ferries, 
canals. 
Public utilities, and bridges and ferries not public utiKtil 
when operated wholly in one county, and electric light Ha 
and similar improvements, canals, ditches, and flumes wbj 
separately taxable, shall be listed and assessed in the couaj 
in which the property is located. 
59-2-106. Repealed. 
PART 2 
ASSESSMENT OF PROPERTY 
59-2-201. Assessment by commission — Determinati 
of value of mining property — Notification j 
assessment — Local assessment of prop 
assessed by the unitary method. 
(1) By May 1 of each year the following property, 
otherwise exempt under the Utah Constitution or under 1 
11 of this chapter, shall be assessed by the commission] 
100% of fair market value, as valued on January 1, • 
accordance with this chapter: 
(a) all property which operates as a unit across con 
lines, if the values must be apportioned among moret 
one county or state; 
(b) all property of public utilities; 
(c) all operating property of an airline, air 
service, and air contract service; 
(d) all geothermal fluids and geothermal resources; I 
(e) all mines and mining claims except in cases, 
determined by the commission, where the mining c% 
are used for other than mining purposes, in which cij 
the value of mining claims used for other than minn 
purposes shall be assessed by the assessor of the county! 
which the mining claims are located; and % 
(f) all machinery used in mining, all property or rt 
face improvements upon or appurtenant to mines i 
mining claims. For the purposes of assessment and ta* 
tion, all processing plants, mills, reduction w o r^ f l ,J? 
smelters which are primarily used by the owner of axnp 
or mining claim for processing, reducing, or smeltil 
minerals taken from a mine or mining claim shall I 
